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‘‘Revolutions Have Become the Bloody
Toy of the Multitude’’
European Revolutions, the South, and the Crisis of 1850
T I M O T H Y M . R O B E R T S
During the mid-nineteenth century the transatlantic world
was in turmoil. Popular disturbances—in some places full-blown revolu-
tions—rocked Europe from Ireland to the western boundaries of Russia.
In America promoters of slavery were considering separating from a
country increasingly resistant to the institution’s aggrandizement. This
time of global political realignment, separatist violence, and exacerbating
racial identification sheds light on two intriguing concepts: the American
response to foreign revolutions and ‘‘southern exceptionalism.’’
David Brion Davis’s Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality
and Foreign Liberations is the most recent assessment of the first con-
cept. Davis focused on American reactions to the French Revolution,
asking how and why a nation created by revolution ‘‘should become in
time the world’s leading adversary of popular revolutions.’’ Davis em-
phasized the conservative influence of slavery on antebellum Americans’
attitudes to foreign revolutions: ‘‘America’s role in a revolutionary world
was always complicated by what James Madison repeatedly called ‘the
blot’ or ‘the stain’ of racial slavery.’’ Slavery, Davis argued, was a prob-
lem for a republic based upon the consent of the governed, rendering
American policymakers skeptical of nations that pursued dreams of a
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more egalitarian world more than ordered liberty. Davis and others em-
phasized the persistence of this conservatism into the twentieth century.1
On the concept of ‘‘southern exceptionalism,’’ John Shelton Reed’s
The Enduring South suggests that the antebellum South’s ethnic and
cultural patterns were so entrenched that the modern South drifted even
further away from the rest of the country. Edward Pessen uncovered
many characteristics shared by the South and North, and Carl Degler
suggested national values either established or modified by the South.
But the thrust of scholarship—including the works of Eugene Genovese,
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, James McPherson, and Kermit Hall, focusing on
issues including the Old South’s economy, politics, culture, and legal
system—has emphasized the region’s peculiarities.2
Although questions about the impact of foreign revolutions on the
1. David Brion Davis, Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and For-
eign Liberations (Cambridge, MA, 1990), 31, 74. Earlier works included John
Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification, 1848–1871 (New York, 1926);
Lloyd Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution
1913–1923 (New York, 1984); Charles Carroll Griffin, The United States and the
Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810–1822 (1937; rep., New York, 1968);
Alfred Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the
Caribbean (Baton Rouge, LA, 1988); Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign
Policy (New Haven, CT, 1987); Howard Marraro, American Opinion on the Uni-
fication of Italy, 1846–1861 (New York, 1932); Arthur James May, Contemporary
American Opinion on the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe (Philadel-
phia, PA, 1927); and William Appleman Williams, America Confronts a Revolu-
tionary World, 1776–1976 (New York, 1976). Another recent assessment is
Michael Morrison, ‘‘American Reaction to European Revolutions, 1848–1852:
Sectionalism, Memory, and the Revolutionary Heritage,’’ Civil War History, 49
(2003), 111–32.
2. John Shelton Reed, The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass
Society (Lexington, MA, 1972); Carl Degler, ‘‘Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis: The
South, the North and the Nation,’’ Journal of Southern History, 53 (1987), 3–18;
Edward Pessen, ‘‘How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North
and South?’’ American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 1119–49; Eugene Genovese,
Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South
(New York, 1965); Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor and Violence in the Old South
(New York, 1986); Kermit Hall and James Ely, Jr., Uncertain Tradition: Constitu-
tionalism and the History of the South (Athens, GA, 1989); and James McPherson,
‘‘Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question,’’ in
Drawn With the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War, ed. James McPher-
son (New York, 1997), 3–23.
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United States and about southern exceptionalism are enduring, the rela-
tionship between them can be explored by revisiting the sectional crisis
of 1850–1851 and viewing it in a transatlantic context. Advocates of
secession at mid-century were stymied not only by the passage of the
Compromise of 1850, but also by news from Europe about the setbacks
to the 1848 revolutions. The disruption of the Union in 1850 was not
avoided because of European events, yet the arguments and rhetoric
from both sides of the secession issue suggest that foreign events influ-
enced domestic political developments. Moreover, this transatlantic per-
spective on the crisis of 1850–1851 helps track the development of
American revolutionary consciousness.
Southern exceptionalism, meanwhile, had limits. Certainly, of any
American group, southerners with ties to slavery were most likely to
become uneasy over news of the European upheavals. Whether ‘‘revolu-
tion’’ meant greater liberty or greater license, the concept suggested a
destruction or change to the existing order. This change did not bode
well for southern society, whose slavery orientation created a conserva-
tive outlook that assumed the maintenance of an inherited order. In
1850, perhaps gazing at Europe, the South Carolina lawyer William
Henry Trescot asked, ‘‘What is the position of the South . . . as a slave-
holding people?’’ Ultimately, however, the South’s position was the
Union position. While slavery’s influence could be felt in southern re-
sponses to turbulent events in Europe, overall the southern reaction,
though perhaps consolidated more quickly, reflected the reaction of the
nation at large.3
Many southerners joined their fellow Americans in initially celebrating
news of the European upheavals. Not only did citizens in northern cities
and towns from New York City to Madison conduct torchlight proces-
sions, so did inhabitants of Richmond, Baltimore, Louisville, Charleston,
St. Louis, and New Orleans. Just as towns in Wisconsin and Pennsylva-
nia renamed themselves ‘‘Lamartine,’’ after the romantic poet who
emerged as the mouthpiece of the new French government, so did a
town in Arkansas. Boston residents organized several ‘‘Indignation Ban-
quets’’ to raise funds for the European revolutionaries. The banquets
3. For discussion of ‘‘conservatism’’ see Samuel Huntington, ‘‘Conservatism as
an Ideology,’’ American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454–73; William
Henry Trescot, The Position and Course of the South (Charleston, SC, 1850), 6.
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were modeled, albeit remotely, on the protests that launched the Paris
uprising in February 1848. People of New Orleans, calling their meals
‘‘Reform Banquets,’’ provided a southern corollary.4
The European upheavals also found brief favor among religious and
secular intellectuals, northern and southern. The Congregational minis-
ter Horace Bushnell declared, ‘‘dynasties subverted . . . enlarged liberty
of conscience, everything beneficent in European affairs is produced by
institutions of the United States.’’ The poet James Russell Lowell was
moved to compose an ‘‘Ode to France’’:
And down the happy future runs a flood
Of prophesying light;
It shows an earth no longer stained with blood,
Blossom and fruit where now we see the bud
Of brotherhood and Right.
George Bancroft thought that Continental events might trigger the down-
fall of the British monarchy, and he spent Easter of 1848 in Paris, trying
to educate leaders of the Second Republic on the framework and merits
of an American-style bicameral legislature.5
Southern intellectuals joined their northern brethren. The Baptist
Banner, published in Louisville, Kentucky, offered an eschatological der-
ivation of the number 666, the ‘‘number of the beast’’ indicated in Reve-
lation, by assigning numerical values to the Latin translations of two
Catholic authorities, Louis Philippe and Pope Pius IX. The Banner even
noted the prophetic significance of news that Pope Pius IX had been
struck with apoplexy on July the Fourth. Meanwhile, Francis Lieber, a
4. Richmond Enquirer, Apr. 28, 1848; New Orleans Daily Picayune, Apr. 12,
1848; Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification, 21; Alphabetical List of
Towns and Counties [taken from the 1880 United States Census] (Alamo, CA,
1970); Henry Gannett, American Names (Washington, DC, 1947); Boston Daily
Evening Transcript, Apr. 2, 1848; Robert Clarke, Jr., ‘‘German Liberals in New
Orleans (1840–1860),’’ Louisiana History Quarterly, 20 (1936), 142.
5. John Bodo, Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812–1848 (Princeton, NJ,
1954), 237; James Russell Lowell, ‘‘Ode to France: February 1848,’’ in Poetical
Works, ed. James Russell Lowell (4 vols., Boston, 1890), 1: 258; Bancroft to
William H. Prescott, July 28, 1848, William H. Prescott Papers (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston); Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American
Relations 1830–1871 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1959), 12.
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Prussian immigrant, became too excited to hold his classes at South
Carolina College over news that ‘‘Germany too is rising.’’ William Gil-
more Simms, the most popular southern writer of his day, joined Edward
Duyckinck, the New York literary leader of the ‘‘Young America’’ move-
ment, in urging indigenous, nationalistic literature, cleaving from Euro-
pean themes. In the spring of 1848, however, Simms rejoiced over
European developments, which he saw linked to the presidential cam-
paign of Zachary Taylor, a man uncorrupted by ties to either the Demo-
cratic or Whig parties (though ultimately he led the Whigs to the White
House in 1848). Simms interpreted the European revolutions of 1848
and Taylor’s candidacy as twin crests of a favorable democratic tide that
would sweep away the creaking monarchies of Europe and the morally
bankrupt American second-party system.6
This enthusiasm for revolutionary Europe, however, soon waned. In
the spring of 1848 the French Second Republic attempted to extend the
revolution from political change to social overhaul, instituting guarantees
of work, shorter workdays, and public relief projects, the ateliers nation-
aux. But then the government suddenly ended its public welfare, decree-
ing that workers would be evacuated for public works in the provinces
or drafted into the army. Furious workers rose in June, barricading Par-
is’s narrow streets. General Eugene Cavaignac ruthlessly cleared the city;
the notorious ‘‘June Days’’ left nearly 5,000 soldiers and workers dead
and confidence in the government fatally wounded.
Such activist government and its apparent consequences caused a
backlash in American opinion. Charles Sumner observed, ‘‘the rich and
the commercial classes [of America] feel that property is rendered inse-
cure,’’ while the New York Herald applauded how the ‘‘ouviers of Paris
. . . were shot down in the streets by the thousands, as they deserved.’’
It warned ‘‘if government can interfere to promote or retard the interest
of . . . the laborer, it can interfere with mechanic, the tailor . . . the
lawyers . . . the clergymen. . . . It can be easily seen to what a state of
things this would lead.’’ New York workers expressed shock at the
French workers’ erection of barricades, and the North American Review
6. Louisville Baptist Banner, May 3, 31, Aug. 23, 1848; Thomas Sergeant
Perry, ed., Life and Letters of Francis Lieber (Boston, MA, 1882), 213–14; Ed-
ward Widmer, Young America: The Flowering of Democracy in New York City
(New York, 1999); William Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and
American National Character (1961; rep., Cambridge, MA, 1979), 275.
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compared European pauperism and misery to an epidemic disease: ‘‘the
government and the laws are hardly . . . responsible for their existence.’’
‘‘We cannot believe,’’ the Review observed, ‘‘that republican institutions
are to blame for this lamentable state of things.’’7
Although northerners worried about a socialist government and soci-
ety emerging in France, southerners especially feared that prospect. Such
a prospect of socialism made it easier for southerners to identify events
in Europe with the disdained northern ‘‘isms.’’ ‘‘We must go crazy with
sympathy because the Parisian mob . . . have undertaken to establish . . .
a pure democracy[,] which I regard as impracticable,’’ lamented David
Outlaw, a North Carolina Whig congressman. Presbyterian scholar
James Henley Thornwell of South Carolina College shuddered at the
division of civilization into ‘‘Atheists, Socialists, Communists, Red Re-
publicans, [and] Jacobins on the one side, and friends of order and regu-
lated freedom on the other.’’ Given his references to European radicals,
Thornwell appeared to be indicting the usual foreign suspects of Ameri-
can conservatives, but actually, he was describing American abolitionists.
Likewise, William Trescot criticized the ‘‘hasty welcome’’ given by the
U.S. Senate in 1848 to the ‘‘socialist’’ government in Paris, seeing it as a
sign of the northern states’ enthusiasm for ‘‘revolutionary restlessness.’’
The news from Europe exacerbated southern suspicions of the North.8
The emancipation of slaves in the French West Indian colonies by the
Second Republic confirmed to many southerners the evil attending the
European revolutions. The Savannah Republican regarded slave eman-
7. Merle Curti, ‘‘Impact of the Revolutions of 1848 on American Thought,’’
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 93 (1949), 211; New York Her-
ald, July 20, 1848; Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise
of the American Working Class, 1788–1850 (New York, 1984), 358; ‘‘French Ideas
of Democracy and a Community of Goods,’’ North American Review, 69 (1849),
314, 279.
8. David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, Mar. 29, 1848, in David Outlaw Papers,
Southern Historical Collection (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill); B. M.
Palmer, Life and Letters of James Henley Thornwell (Richmond, VA, 1875), 303;
Anne Loveland, Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order, 1800–1860 (Baton
Rouge, LA, 1980), 97, 127, 259; Trescot, Position and Course of the South, 13.
For an assessment of the Congress’s skepticism about the French Second Repub-
lic, see Richard Rohrs, ‘‘American Critics of the French Revolution of 1848,’’
Journal of the Early Republic, 14 (1994), 359–77.
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cipation as a ‘‘cruel absurdity.’’ The anonymous ‘‘J.’’, writing in the
Southern Quarterly Review, predicted that the West Indian emancipation
would precipitate another ‘‘St. Domingo,’’ recalling the violence accom-
panying the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804. Together with signs of
budding socialism, emancipation confirmed that fanatics were running
the young French republic.9
Fanaticism seemed to be moving closer to home, moreover, in the
form of immigrant labor sympathetic to the northern Free Soil move-
ment. Before the late 1840s the proslavery regime took comfort in the
way that slavery served to ‘‘exclu[de] a populace made up of the dregs
of Europe’’; in 1850 only one in twenty free southerners was not native-
born.10
But now Free Soilers were not content to harangue defenders of slav-
ery from a distance. ‘‘The free soil movement is extending and barnburn-
ers are to be found . . . in Maryland and Virginia,’’ David Outlaw
observed. Southern leaders saw a southern corollary to the northern Free
Soil movement, potentially hostile to slavery, developing among foreign-
born workingmen in the South. After the revolution of 1848, German
refugees brought radical ideas to the South, organizing Free German
Societies (known as the Turnverein) in many southern cities. As radical
refugees of an Old World dominated by a landlord class, the so-called
Turners opposed tyranny of all sorts. Some Turner ideas, such as the
abolition of the presidency, were far-fetched, but others, including calls
for restriction of slavery, were more realistic and dangerous. In 1849
John C. Calhoun received word that immigrant laborers in various Deep
South cities were agitating against proslavery authorities. ‘‘The issue of
Free Labour against Slave Labour will soon be made in the South,’’
9. Eugene Curtis, ‘‘American Opinion of the French Nineteenth-Century Rev-
olutions,’’ American Historical Review, 29 (1924), 258; J., ‘‘The National Anni-
versary,’’ Southern Quarterly Review, 2 (1850), 181. For the impact of Haiti see
Lester Langley, The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850 (New Haven,
CT, 1996), 87–144, and Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America.
10. Genovese, Political Economy of Slavery, 231–32; Ira Berlin and Herbert
Gutman, ‘‘Natives and Immigrants, Free Men and Slaves: Urban Workingmen in
the Antebellum American South,’’ American Historical Review, 88 (1983), 1175–
76, 1197.
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noted Calhoun’s correspondent. By the end of the 1840s the threat to
southern society appeared close at hand.11
To slavery advocates, Free Soilers were seeking to strangle the South
by violating fundamental American principles of protection of property—
the right to possess slaves and to carry them into the West. Southern
liberty was at risk no less than it had been in 1776, said an Alabama
congressman: ‘‘the power to dictate what sort of property the State may
allow a citizen to own and work—whether oxen, horses, or Negroes . . .
is . . . tyrannical.’’ Domestic and international forces, both considered
alien, threatened southern property rights.12
To defend against this perceived alliance of northern Free Soilers and
foreign radicals, southern ideologues joined Americans elsewhere in es-
pousing a peculiar American revolutionary heritage that established ideo-
logical distance between antebellum America and its enemies. They
distinguished the United States from Europe by emphasizing the Ameri-
can Revolution’s minimal social upheaval and violence, the material
prosperity enjoyed by Americans both before and after the conflict, the
safeguarding of Christian values, and the American Revolution’s success
compared to the Europeans’ apparent inability to achieve similar results.
Each of these factors set the American revolutionary identity apart from
the European experience.
Various examples illustrate this tendency. The Washington National
Intelligencer declared in the autumn of 1848 that the United States was
a revolutionary model because it had abandoned violence since gaining
independence. Comparing domestic authority in the United States and
Europe, the Intelligencer deemed the former supreme on account of ‘‘its
wise unwillingness to yield to force, for only fools and cowards commit
that blunder.’’ The Intelligencer noted that disturbances like Shays’s Re-
bellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Nullification, and the Rhode Island Dorr
Rebellion were resolved through peaceable compromise. Such a morality
tale was misleading: in each case actual or threatened deployment of
11. David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, July 28, 1848, David Outlaw Papers;
Bruce Levine, Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Com-
ing of the Civil War (Urbana, IL, 1992), 91–95; Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-
Thought Struggle in the Old South (1940; rep., New York, 1964), 340–41; Berlin
and Gutman, ‘‘Natives and Immigrants,’’ 1198.
12. J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama,
1800–1860 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1978), 213.
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military force was necessary to maintain the political and social order.
However, in the Intelligencer’s cameo history of antirevolution in the
United States, it was the national organic makeup that corrected acts of
revolutionary mischief, not recourse to superior might.13
Students and scholars helped articulate this revolutionary tradition.
The Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth, having fled the clutches of
Austria and Russia, toured the United States in 1852 in support of Hun-
garian independence. In Philadelphia he was feted by students who had
composed essays that reflected a pedagogical emphasis on the proprie-
tary nature of the American revolutionary inheritance. Master Samuel
Scott, for example, directed Kossuth to
behold . . . France[,] possessor [of] a liberty unsuited to its wants; Italy again
subjected to the cruel yoke; and . . . Hungary trodden down upon by the Austrian
conqueror. . . . Let our Union’s example induce others to show the same fraternal
affection, and let liberty arise triumphant as the sun in noonday splendor.
George Bancroft reflected upon the European revolutions implicitly in
his description of the American Revolution, which appeared in 1852:
For Europe, the crisis foreboded the struggles of generations. . . . In the impending
chaos of states, the ancient forms of society, after convulsive agonies, were doomed
to be broken in pieces. . . . In America, the influences of time were molded by the
creative force of reason, sentiment and nature. Its political edifice rose in lovely
proportions, as if to melodies of the lyre. Peacefully and without crime . . . the
American Revolution . . . was most radical in its character, yet achieved with such
benign tranquility, that even conservatism hesitated to censure.14
Southerners also offered paeans to American revolutionary exception-
alism. The jurist Beverly Tucker distinguished between old (Anglo-
13. [Washington] National Intelligencer, Sept. 20, 1848, May 16, 21, 1842;
Richard Ellis, Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights, and the Nulli-
fication Crisis (New York, 1987), 91–93, 160–65; William Ames, History of the
National Intelligencer (Chapel Hill, NC, 1972), 206–207.
14. Donald Spencer, Louis Kossuth and Young America: A Study of Sectional-
ism and Foreign Policy, 1848–1852 (Columbia, MO, 1977), and Morrison,
‘‘American Reaction to European Revolutions’’; Welcome of Louis Kossuth, Gover-
nor of Hungary, to Philadelphia, by the Youth (Philadelphia, PA, 1852), 122;
George Bancroft, History of the United States, quoted in The Ambiguity of the
American Revolution, ed. Jack Greene (New York, 1968), 49, 50, 54.
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Saxon) revolutions, including the American independence movement,
which sought ‘‘to vindicate the rights of property,’’ and new (Continen-
tal) ones, which ‘‘assail[ed]’’ such rights. The French people were ‘‘slow
to understand’’ that the only justifiable upheavals were those ensuring
that the government protected existing rights. Tucker affirmed the South
as the grand sanctifier of property—and, therefore, the most resolute
protector of an inviolable American revolutionary way. Likewise, spurred
by the specter of a new international revolution against slavery and social
order, southern writers revised the story of American independence,
showing the South as the originator and inheritor of the distinct Ameri-
can revolutionary principles. William Gilmore Simms published a parti-
san account, ‘‘South Carolina in the Revolution,’’ to encourage the South
to ‘‘reassert her history’’ and to ‘‘furnish an argument, much needed, to
our [southern] politicians.’’ Simms’s narratives of the American Revolu-
tion have been rightly seen as a veiled reaction to abolitionist tracts. But
Simms was also part of a national coterie of historians and novelists who
rendered the American revolutionary past as a guideline for resisting
innovation.15
Actually, in their attitude toward revolutions, southerners resembled
the Catholic Church. Of course, sometimes apologists for Catholicism
and for slavery were the same voice. Bishop Francis Gartland of Savan-
nah, for example, when writing to Ireland to recruit priests, warned a
Dublin seminary not to send clerics ‘‘manifesting more wisdom than
their Church, by their intemperate and untimely zeal for the freedom of
the slave population. All that we have to do is mite their souls [so that]
whether bond or free they may be saved.’’ Archbishop John Hughes in
New York City, although not a defender of slavery per se, shared Bishop
Gartland’s conservatism. To Hughes, European revolutionaries exhib-
ited an ‘‘intemperate and untimely zeal for freedom.’’ This was different
from Americans’ experience because their independence did not ‘‘turn
upon the spontaneous whim of the people to overthrow one form of
government in order to substitute another.’’ Instead, the American Revo-
lution had effected political change by vindicating the deliberations of ‘‘a
15. [Beverly Tucker,] ‘‘Present State of Europe,’’ Southern Quarterly Review,
16 (1850), 286, 298; Simms quoted in Drew Gilpin Faust, A Sacred Circle: The
Dilemma of the Intellectual in the Old South, 1840–1860 (Baltimore, MD, 1977),
75; Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Histor-
ical Imagination (Ithaca, NY, 1988), 51–54, 155–56.
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fair majority of the reasoning part of the community.’’ Europeans’
snatching after liberty, rather than cultivating it, had left them even less
freedom after their uprisings in 1848. Hughes emphasized the irony that
‘‘the reason for the revolution in France [in 1848], was that French citi-
zens were not permitted to assemble at banquets. . . . Now, under a
popular government, created by a successful revolution . . . they are
denied even the miserable privilege of complaint.’’ On account of its
alleged gentleness, however, the American Revolution ‘‘[bore] but few
grounds of comparision’’ with the revolutions in Europe. Hughes envi-
sioned revolutions as gradual and logical affairs—and the European ver-
sions failed these tests.16
Twin emphases on what might be called a ‘‘gradual majority’’ linked
these Americans’ defense of slavery and defense of the Catholic Church
during the European upheavals. Archbishop Hughes’s deliberative ‘‘fair
majority,’’ though not exactly the same concept, resembled the ‘‘concur-
rent majority’’ envisioned by John C. Calhoun in Disquisition on Gov-
ernment, completed shortly before his death in 1849. The Disquisition
shows a southern mindset grappling with a tumultuous transatlantic
world, with Calhoun envisioning an increasingly sectionalized America
represented ultimately by two presidents, North and South, each with a
constitutional veto. The concurrence of all interest groups regarding vital
public matters, not simply a popular majority much less a revolutionary
uprising, would thus be necessary to change the status quo. Southern
ideologues like Calhoun joined Catholic authorities up and down the
Atlantic seaboard in defining a ‘‘good’’ revolution by its gradualism and
its preservation of private property. These criteria set impossible stan-
dards for the upheavals in Europe.
Southerners added another characteristic of the American revolution-
ary experience: the resilient supremacy of local government. Develop-
ments in France in 1848 revealed how the French had mistakenly
allowed their national government to become too sophisticated, eroding
the provinces’ authority. In an analysis of French democracy, the South-
ern Quarterly Review noted the absence of states’ rights from the French
system. States’ rights were ‘‘the grand conservative feature in our sys-
tem,’’ the article stated, ‘‘the one most important of all advantages’’ of
16. David Gleeson, Irish in the South, 1815–1877 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001),
139; John Hughes, The Church and the World. A Lecture (New York, 1850), 26.
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American republicanism. Even the location of the national government
in Paris jeopardized the French political system. ‘‘France’s safety,’’ wrote
William Gilmore Simms, ‘‘will depend . . . upon a removal from Paris of
the seat of government.’’ Paris was ‘‘the centre of European attraction,
and the seat of sciences, fashion and pleasure,’’ opined the Southern
Quarterly Review. Such attributes detracted from good government, fos-
tering vanity among Parisians, whose concern for provincial interests
would dwindle, presumably, in the midst of such decadence. Central
government would be better set in a crude and, therefore, functional
place like Washington, DC.17
Sensitivity to the weakening of provincial power by central authority
was, however, shared by Americans North and South. One New York
journal described France as ‘‘above all other countries of the globe a
centralization, . . . its heart and head . . . Paris.’’ Another decried the
country’s ‘‘sad system,’’ where ‘‘forty thousand communes’’ were
‘‘chained by the commune of Paris.’’ A third alleged that ‘‘Centralization
has always been the stumbling block for freedom in France.’’ Contrasting
American stability with French tumult, this journal ironically pointed to
U.S. origins in ‘‘a number of colonies, and wide extent of country, creat-
ing sectional interests and consequently sectional feelings.’’ Many north-
erners thus shared southerners’ embrace of local authority at mid-century
as an important aspect of American revolutionary tradition.18
While southern observers focused on revolutionary France, they did
distinguish between the events of Paris and revolutionary developments
elsewhere in Europe. Southerners sympathized especially with the strug-
gles of Hungarians and held rallies in New Orleans and Atlanta, and each
citizen in Little Rock resolved in 1849 to contribute ten cents a month
to the achievement of European liberty. Towns not only in Iowa, Indi-
ana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, but also Mississippi, were renamed ‘‘Kos-
suth,’’ in honor of the Hungarian revolutionary. Southern newspapers
17. ‘‘Guizot’s Democracy in France,’’ Southern Quarterly Review, 15 (1849),
164; William Gilmore Simms to James Henry Hammond, May 20, 1848, in Let-
ters of William Gilmore Simms, ed. Mary Simms Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell,
and T. C. Duncan Eaves (6 vols., Columbia, SC, 1952–1982), 2: 411; ‘‘Constitu-
tions of France,’’ Southern Quarterly Review, 16 (1850), 504.
18. ‘‘Absolutism Versus Republicanism. The State of Europe,’’ United States
Democratic Review, 31 (1852), 598; ‘‘Foreign Correspondence,’’ The Living Age,
May 6, 1848, 283; ‘‘Miscellany,’’ American Whig Review, 11 (1850), 657.
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were as likely as their northern counterparts to compare Kossuth to Wash-
ington and to acclaim the Hungarians as the ‘‘Americans of Europe.’’
Mississippi Senator Henry Foote sponsored legislation to grant federal
lands to Hungarian refugees on condition of their permanent settlement
and naturalization as citizens. Foote declared that those who believed that
the South ‘‘would react with cold indifference toward the establishment
of free institutions in Hungary . . . know very little of the lofty characteris-
tics which belong to the slave-holding population of the Union.’’ If French
revolution-making drew scorn on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line,
Hungary’s cause provoked national sympathy.19
In praising Hungary, however, southern literati could sometimes not
muffle the domestic tensions in the background of all Americans’ views
of Europe at mid-century. In 1849 the Hungarian revolution against the
Hapsburg Empire spilled over into an ethnic conflict of Croats and Serbs
living within Hungary. But the Southern Literary Messenger showed a
sense of fraternity with the Magyars—even at one point using the vocabu-
lary of the simmering American dispute over slavery to characterize over-
seas conditions. The Messenger opined that ‘‘the [Hungarians are] fully
aware of their dangerous position . . . hated by the Slaves, isolated among
the nations of the earth, they were left alone . . . to resist this conspiracy
against them.’’ The spelling in the Messenger of the modern word ‘‘Slav’’
as ‘‘Slave’’ was consistent with other American periodicals’ grammar of
the day. But with its tone and contextual language the southern journal’s
sympathy for the Hungarians’ plight sounded like a bleak southern self-
assessment.20
Northerners’ expressions of sympathy for the Hungarians resembled
those of the southerners in their friendly comparisons of the American
and Hungarian revolutionary capacities, denigration of Hungary’s ene-
mies, and, indeed, in their references to American slavery. Sympathy
demonstrations, such as one headed by ‘‘citizen’’ Abraham Lincoln, re-
solved, ‘‘Recognition of the independence of Hungary by our govern-
ment is due from American freemen to their struggling brethren, to the
19. The Liberator (Boston), Dec. 7, 1849; Robert Gale, Cultural Encyclopedia
of the 1850s in America (Portsmouth, NH, 1993), 222; Alphabetical List of Towns
and Counties; Gannett, American Names; May, Contemporary American Opinion,
33–48; Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1 Session, 293; Ibid., Appendix, 47.
20. ‘‘Glimpses at Europe in 1848, Part I: Magyar and Croat,’’ Southern Liter-
ary Messenger, 15 (1849), 8.
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general cause of Republican liberty.’’ At a Philadelphia meeting speaker
John Forney, editor of the Pennsylvanian newspaper, went to astonish-
ing lengths to indicate the similarities between present European and
former American military leaders. The Hungarian general Arthur Görgey
was a latter-day Francis Marion; Polish Generals Jozef Bem and Henryk
Dembinski, who were assisting the Hungarians, resembled Anthony
Wayne and Nathaniel Greene of the Continental Army; and Lajos Kos-
suth was the reincarnation not only of George Washington but also Pat-
rick Henry, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Fisher Ames. Moreover,
as British forces had sought alliances with ‘‘the fierce savages of our own
wilderness’’ against the colonists, now Austria ‘‘has excited among the
rude Serbians and Croatians a most bloody rebellion [against Hun-
gary].’’ Forney’s demonization of Serbians and Croatians by comparison
to American Indians not only hearkened to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, where Jefferson alleged the British monarchy had stirred the
‘‘merciless Indian savages’’ against the colonists. It also echoed southern
opinion, which likewise denigrated Hungary’s enemies as savages.21
Northern antislavery advocates also used the Hungarian uprising to
press the issue of American slavery. Frederick Douglass directed his
newspaper’s readers to ‘‘help the American Kossuths,’’ and the North
Star and other abolitionist presses labeled the hunting of fugitive slaves
‘‘Austrianism.’’ Black abolitionists in Ohio summoned ‘‘the Russian serf,
the Hungarian peasant, [the] American slave and all other oppressed
people [to] unite against tyrants.’’ Senator John Hale of New Hampshire,
meanwhile, attempted to amend Henry Foote’s resolution on behalf of
the Hungarian refugees, adding language broadening the legislation to
criticize American slavery. By dwelling not on slaves’ black identity but
on their status as refugees hounded by draconian authorities, abolition-
ists sought to divert northerners from support for or compliance with
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. American partisans, North and South,
portrayed the slavery controversy in terms made more congenial by Eu-
ropean events: the right simply to be left alone by the government.22
Why did southerners join northerners in supporting Hungarian liber-
21. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy Basler (9 vols., New Bruns-
wick, NJ, 1953–1955), 2: 62; Philadelphia Public Ledger, Aug. 21, 1849.
22. Spencer, Louis Kossuth and Young America, 69, 73–75; Proceedings of the
Black State Conventions, 1840–1865, ed. Philip Foner and George Walker (2 vols.,
Philadelphia, PA, 1979), 1: 276–77.
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ation, while doubting the French upheaval? Hungarians were not pro-
moting socialist utopias, nor did they maintain West Indian plantations,
where slave emancipation was looming. Moreover, unlike France, Hun-
gary did not appear to be trying to extend its revolution to areas near or
within American borders. Southerners shared northerners’ revulsion
over France’s pathological revolutionary past. Hungary, in contrast, had
no preexisting revolutionary identity gone sour. Like the American patri-
ots of old, contemporary Hungarian freedom fighters existed at a dis-
tance from antebellum America and lacked the stain of revolutionary
failure.
In March 1849 the Frankfurt Assembly, after meeting for nearly a year
to create an all-German constitutional republic, abandoned its plans and
asked Frederick William, the King of Prussia, to rule a liberal German
empire. But Frederick refused the invitation, embarrassing the assembly
and thwarting nascent German democracy. Under threat of arrest the
assembly relocated from Frankfurt to Stuttgart, where the delegates suf-
fered the indignity of being locked out of their arranged meeting place.
John C. Calhoun had earlier instructed the Prussian minister in Wash-
ington on how to implement republican and federal political philosophy:
‘‘If the [German states] do not attempt too much,’’ he wrote, ‘‘[their] old
institutions’’ could ‘‘do much to strengthen them.’’ Ironically, the Frank-
furt Assembly acted as if it were following Calhoun’s advice too well:
accomplishing little by May 1849, its delegates dispersed for good.23
But radical political conventions were taking place on both sides of
the Atlantic at the time. In response to what they understood as an
emerging threat to slavery, southern extremists met in 1850 to openly
consider secession from the Union. Like the members of the beleaguered
Frankfurt Assembly, secessionists hoped to frame a movement to create
a distinct nation.
Proslavery southerners’ worries grew dramatically as the presidency
of Zachary Taylor unfolded. Despite his slaveholding and southern roots,
23. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899,
Vol. II: Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, ed. J. Franklin Jameson (Washington,
DC, 1900), 748–50; Merle Curti, ‘‘John C. Calhoun and the Unification of Ger-
many,’’ American Historical Review, 40 (1935), 476–78; Frank Eyck, Frankfurt
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The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848–1849 (Princeton, NJ,
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Taylor displayed national, not sectional, allegiance, declaring in late 1849
that if legislation to prohibit territorial slavery passed the Congress he
would not stop it from becoming federal law. The territories of New
Mexico and California began preparations to enter the Union with state
constitutions that prohibited slavery. Antislavery delegates to the consti-
tutional convention of California went so far as to proclaim that ‘‘the eyes
of all Europe are now directed toward California.’’ Horace Mann, an
educational reformer and U.S. senator from Massachusetts, bluntly told
southern congressmen that the civilized world was against the South.24
Dismayed southerners reacted angrily to domestic and international
threats to the established order, a dramatic reversal from their attitude
during the ‘‘springtime of the peoples’’ in 1848. Then, for example,
the Richmond Enquirer had envisioned the American Revolution being
extended in Europe, celebrating how ‘‘American principles are trium-
phant’’ in the Old World. Two years later the Enquirer was again es-
pousing an American revolutionary consciousness, but one needing
sectional protection, not one conducive to national export. Now the En-
quirer asserted that the South was called to protect what the ‘‘Union of
the old thirteen states’’ had achieved: the right to an ‘‘undisturbed enjoy-
ment of slave property.’’25
Mississippi state leaders convened to endorse state sovereignty, con-
demn congressional restrictions on territorial slavery, and call all slave-
holding states to a great convention to devise resistance to northern
aggressions. The convention, set for Nashville in June 1850, would be
the first time that southern political leaders would meet explicitly to
consider a sectional separation. The Tennessean Cave Johnson noted
among those headed for Nashville ‘‘a settled determination with the ex-
treme men . . . to dissolve the Union.’’ The situation seemed critical,
even to international observers. The American minister in Naples re-
ported that Italian newspapers were taking bets on the imminent dissolu-
tion of the United States.26
24. Christian Fritz, ‘‘Popular Sovereignty, Vigilantism, and the Constitutional
Right of Revolution,’’ Pacific Historical Review, 63 (1994), 50; Avery Craven,
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Meanwhile in early 1850 Congress tried to diffuse the mounting crisis.
Senator Henry Clay introduced a series of resolutions proposing offsett-
ing concessions to the antislavery and proslavery forces, which resulted
in the Compromise of 1850. The compromise abolished the slave trade
in Washington, DC, admitted California to the Union as a free state,
passed a strict federal law to ease the capture and return of runaway
slaves, and resolved a boundary dispute between New Mexico and
Texas. Several factors led to the passage of the compromise after nine
months of debate: the eloquence of Clay and Daniel Webster prodded
Congress to move toward conciliation; the death of President Taylor in
the summer of 1850 removed a dogmatic voice; the death of Calhoun
during the debate provided southern advocates more flexibility; and the
parliamentary skills of Stephen Douglas pushed the compromise toward
its passage after Clay gave up.27
The specter of bloody revolution also haunted the Senate’s attempts
to prevent sectional conflict. Those who favored compromise measures
used the prospect of violent interstate conflict as an argument in support
of Clay’s proposals. Calhoun warned that soon only military force would
remain to hold the country together, should agitation on the slavery issue
continue. Clay averred that if northerners interfered with slavery where
it existed, ‘‘my voice would be for war.’’ The prospect of sectional con-
flict, a war ‘‘in which all mankind would be against us; in which our own
history itself would be against us,’’ prodded legislators to search for ways
to avoid the violence of a sectional civil uprising, the specter of the
United States replicating scenes of European revolution and reaction.
While domestic factors exerted the greatest influence on American states-
men to work out their positions on the compromise, international events
also played a role.28
Various congressional speakers on both sides of the slavery question
invoked the revolutions of 1848 and the counterrevolutions of 1850 to
bolster their case. Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi warned the North
of the Two Sicilies: Instructions and Despatches 1816–1861 (2 vols., New York,
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to respect southern rights or risk the troubles of the imperial powers in
Europe: ‘‘Picture to yourselves Hungary, resisting the powers of Austria
and Russia; and if Hungary, which had never tasted liberty, could make
such stout resistance, what may you not anticipate from eight millions of
southrons made desperate by your aggression?’’ Brown portrayed south-
erners and Hungarian insurgents as defensive patriots, not radicals.29
By contrast, northern senators opposed to a southern independence
movement emphasized the differences between American and European
circumstances. William Seward predicted that slavery’s days were num-
bered because it violated ‘‘the tide of social progress.’’ Slavery and Euro-
pean aristocracy were natural allies; this alliance had arrested revolutions
in Europe and now threatened ‘‘progress’’ in the United States. ‘‘Eman-
cipation,’’ said Seward, on the other hand, ‘‘is a democratic revolu-
tion.’’30
Seward, moreover, scoffed at southerners’ threats that such a violent
upheaval might happen in America. He cited the separation of powers
inherent in government as a buffer against revolution. ‘‘The constituent
members of this democracy . . . are not the citizens of a metropolis like
Paris, or of a region subjected to the influences of a metropolis like
France; but they are husbandmen, dispersed over this broad land.’’ Thus
Seward echoed the above-noted American critiques of the cosmopolitan
influence of European capitals as an inducement to revolution. The pro-
tagonists in the slavery debate took inspiration and evidence from revolu-
tionary Europe. Sometimes they likened domestic scenes to transatlantic
corollaries. Other times they reasserted exceptional American conditions
arising from the nation’s revolutionary founding. Their sense of transat-
lantic community at the mid-nineteenth century was selective and com-
plicated.31
The great northern advocate of the Compromise of 1850, Daniel
Webster, took threats of southern belligerence more seriously than did
Seward. Webster saw violence over the slavery issue as a real possibility
and endorsed Henry Clay’s proposed strengthening of the fugitive slave
laws, facilitating eventual passage of the compromise. ‘‘I hear with pain
and anguish the word secession,’’ said Webster. ‘‘There can be no such
29. Ibid., 259.
30. Ibid., Appendix, 268.
31. Ibid., 267–68.
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thing as peaceable secession. . . . [T]hat disruption must produce such
a war as I will not describe.’’ Webster feared that the lessons of European
revolution had not been heeded. ‘‘No monarchical throne presses these
states together. . . . To break up! to break up this great Government! to
dismember this great country! to astonish Europe with an act of
folly . . . ! No, sir! no, sir!’’32
Perhaps Webster was describing a unity he hoped to inspire, because
at that moment talk of secession was in earnest. As Webster made his
plea for peace and the debate on Clay’s omnibus compromise drifted into
June 1850, representatives of nine southern states arrived in Nashville to
deliberate about the course of the South and to engage in ‘‘cool calcula-
tion [of] the advantages . . . of a Southern Confederacy.’’ The Nashville
delegates, 175 at a June convention, and 59 at a subsequent meeting in
November, were hardly typical southerners: they were political elites,
mostly slaveowners, and some ‘‘fire-eaters,’’ persistent advocates of
southern independence as a weapon against democratic change that
seemed to take on international proportions. The conventions had a
strange status: though called to contemplate disunion, most of the dele-
gates were selected by their state legislatures and therefore had legal if
not federal sanction. The views of many of the convention delegates
about secession were radical only because eventually they would prove
to be ahead of, not different from, most southerners’ opinion. How did
these potential American revolutionaries understand ‘‘revolution’’ in
1850?33
The Nashville Convention began in June with a reiteration of the
grievances of the South: the region was under threat of external revolu-
tionary forces, residing both across the Mason-Dixon Line and across
the Atlantic. Judge George Goldthwaite of Alabama stated what he as-
sumed all of the Nashville delegates already knew: ‘‘It could not be dis-
guised that the civilized world was leagued abroad against us.
Revolutionary France [has] . . . set free three hundred thousand slaves
. . . and other nations of Europe [have done] the same also.’’ Concur-
rently the northern states had voted to restrict slavery to its present lim-
32. Ibid., 276.
33. Sioussat, ‘‘Tennessee,’’ 319; Thelma Jennings, The Nashville Convention:
Southern Movement for Unity, 1848–1851 (Memphis, TN, 1980); Eric Walther,
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its. Abolitionists, ‘‘who, a few years [ago], were mobbed, now [have
their] views adopted in the pulpits and in the . . . schools.’’ Under these
desperate conditions Goldthwaite urged action. ‘‘Suppose [secession]
produced not only war, but famine and destruction. Suppose the fertile
fields were deluged in blood! Is that any reason why we should ignomini-
ously submit and put off the evil day?’’ Goldthwaite urged secession
as a matter of both expediency and principle. His was revolutionary
rhetoric.34
Other Nashville delegates declared for secession not as an act of hon-
orable desperation, but for its economic promise. Several imagined the
South ruining depleted northern manufacturers and forging powerful
trade relations with a Europe too eager for cotton to allow northern
aggression to interrupt Atlantic trade. The South Carolinian Langdon
Cheves envisioned a southern republic blessed by favorable soil and cli-
mate as ‘‘one of the most splendid empires in which the sun ever shone.’’
Beverly Tucker of Virginia envisioned a Europe ‘‘determined to oppose
. . . any war that might disturb her commerce . . . on which her very
existence depends.’’35
Southerners outside the convention echoed these views. William
Henry Trescot envisioned the South as ‘‘the guardian of the world’s
commerce,’’ commanding a powerful exchange of cotton and manufac-
tured goods through the Gulf of Mexico. A pamphlet of the Southern
Rights Association calculated that some twelve million people’s liveli-
hood in America and Europe depended on the ‘‘cotton raised by the
slaves of the Southern States.’’ Surely ‘‘should there be war all the na-
tions of Europe would desire to preserve their commercial intercourse’’
with this life-giving system in the South, said a South Carolina legislator,
thus defying abolitionists who wished ‘‘a revolution in the affairs of the
civilized world.’’36
Such comments reveal the complicated radical southern proslavery
agenda in the early 1850s, especially with regard to Europe. Foreign
revolutionaries and their northern minions who threatened to overthrow
34. ‘‘The Southern Convention,’’ Southern Quarterly Review, 18 (1850),
227–28.
35. Potter, Impending Crisis, 462: ‘‘The Southern Convention,’’ 220.
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southern civilization enraged secession advocates. At the same time they
were keenly interested in establishing an autonomous partnership be-
tween the South and the trading and manufacturing concerns of Europe,
uninterrupted by political agitation. Europe’s appeal thus lay not in its
revolutionary experiments with social reform but in the maintenance of
its economic status quo. This commercial interest actually helped to dif-
fuse the sectional crisis by draining interest from disruptive politics.
Developments on both sides of the Atlantic seemed to validate such
conservatism. In Congress, measures to reconcile the issue of territorial
slavery were sent to the full Senate in May 1850, and in September
President Fillmore signed the compromise bills into federal law. Such
reconciliation measures deflected many would-be secessionists’ hunger
for disruption. Meanwhile Louis Napoleon in France moved toward cur-
tailing the liberal regime of the Second Republic. In direct violation of
the French Constitution of 1848, Napoleon imposed a three-year resi-
dence requirement for suffrage, disenfranchising some three million vot-
ers and reserving the franchise for a minority of the French people,
largely legitimists seeking to recreate the authoritarian stability of the July
Monarchy.37
American opinion divided over Napoleon’s action, some newspapers
bemoaning the rise of European ‘‘despotism’’ and ‘‘absolutism,’’ others
praising the return of Old World stability. Robert Walsh, the American
consul in Paris, offered an official U.S. response to Napoleon’s rise, de-
scribing it as ‘‘the only . . . chance of dealing with dark doings of . . .
[an] immense democratic conspiracy which threatened Europe.’’ Walsh’s
pejorative comment on ‘‘democracy,’’ reported in the American press,
must have heartened southern ideologues like William Trescot and James
Henry Hammond, who also suspected the concept. While Trescot la-
mented the ‘‘strange zeal’’ of slaveholders ‘‘to be good democrats,’’ thus
‘‘betray[ing] the South,’’ Hammond indicted ‘‘Democratic republics in
which universal suffrage and offices are open to all’’ as the ‘‘the worst of
all forms of Government.’’ ‘‘Democracy’’ was a controversial concept in
the mid-nineteenth-century transatlantic world, perhaps like ‘‘socialism’’
37. Jennings, The Nashville Convention, 174–75, 187–88; William Freehling,
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in the twentieth century. Ironically, authoritarianism in Europe at the
time helped pull the troubled American democracy from the brink of
fragmentation.38
Southern radicals subsequently showed a reluctance to move toward
secession, once they saw the prospect of reconciliation in Congress and
understood the disastrous consequences of revolutions overseas. Dele-
gates gathered again in Nashville in November 1850 to consider their
options. They plainly were less restive in light of transatlantic setbacks
to democratic reform: the reassertion of authoritarian government in Eu-
rope and the passage of a harsh national fugitive slave law, which one
historian has aptly deemed an ‘‘American 1848.’’ Delegates to the second
Nashville Convention, joining the governor of Alabama, state conven-
tions in Georgia and Mississippi, and the Richmond Enquirer, moved
from plans to secede to philosophical justifications of the right to secede,
at the same time declaring that the existing situation did not justify actual
recourse to such a drastic measure. It is symbolic that Andrew Jackson
Donelson, the U.S. minister in Germany at the time of the Frankfurt
Assembly’s dispersal, having been recalled by the Whig administration,
influenced the Nashville Convention in November toward its moderate
position. Donelson could bear witness to what happened to German
ideologues lingering too long over a radical agenda.39
As the secession debate continued into 1851, southerners both for
and against secession uniformly renounced any discussion of southern
revolution, so negative had the transatlantic image of that concept be-
come. Advocates for the right to secede, largely southern Democrats,
distinguished between secession and revolution. Secession was a theoret-
ically prescribed, peaceful remedy, thoroughly grounded in American
political practice. Revolution, on the other hand, was violent, and, more-
over, reminiscent of recent scenes in Europe; it was foreign to the Ameri-
can experience. A Louisiana newspaper described secession as the
38. Henry Casper, American Attitudes Toward the Rise of Napoleon III (Wash-
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peaceable withdrawal of one party from a contractual partnership, once
he decides that the partnership no longer benefits him. ‘‘He takes his
portion of the stock, makes his bow, and retires. This is Secession.’’ In
contrast, revolution was a much more hostile form of severance. ‘‘If [the
party] should seize a musket, rush into the establishment . . . that would
be Revolution.’’ In 1860–1861 southerners would launch an unconstitu-
tional disunion movement, rather than back away from it, because the
election of Lincoln and the ‘‘black Republicans’’ represented an immi-
nent threat of unconstitutional coercion lacking a decade earlier. The
idea that secession was constitutional, but revolution was not, however,
emerged in secessionists’ efforts in 1850 to distinguish their undertaking
from what they perceived as European fanaticism.40
The planter Langdon Cheves developed this point in a slightly differ-
ent way. He persistently warned of the threat of international forces to
the South. He favored secession as a way to avoid the even bleaker
prospect of a South destroyed by domestic violence. Cheves argued that
while supporters of ‘‘free soil’’ wished for the moment only to ‘‘pen
[slavery] up within restricted limits,’’ fanaticism ‘‘has no stopping place.’’
He predicted that antislavery efforts would eventually trigger a race revo-
lution, resembling ‘‘the sufferings, the massacre and the banishment, in
poverty and misery, of the white proprietors of Hayti,’’ which for a half
century had been a nightmare for American planters. Interestingly, in
Nashville Cheves raised the model of Haiti to promote preemptive seces-
sion, in effect denouncing one form of unacceptable, and un-American,
revolution, that of racial upheaval, in order to promote another one, that
of political exodus, more grounded in American orthodoxy.41
Opponents of southern secession, mainly Whigs, argued it was unac-
ceptable precisely because it was revolution. Alexander Stephens of
Georgia warned hotheads to ‘‘beward of revolution—refer to France. . . .
The right of secession is . . . a right of revolution, and . . . no just cause
for the exercise of such right exists.’’ A Whig newspaper in Georgia
argued that the right of secession ‘‘must be . . . a revolutionary sentiment
directly leading to the destruction of the government.’’ Whig journals in
40. New Orleans Louisiana Statesman, quoted in Richmond Enquirer, Nov.
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Washington, DC, and Tennessee affirmed that there was no difference
between secession and revolution, and that seceding would mean bloody
civil war. Although southern Democrats and Whigs differed over seces-
sion, most agreed that revolution was an unacceptably dangerous alterna-
tive to present troubled conditions.42
By 1851 southerners saw the failed upheavals of Europe as examples
of authoritarian triumph over virtuous but disorganized advocates of rev-
olutionary republicanism and local government. John Townsend com-
plained that the cooling of secession ardor elsewhere had made it suicidal
to establish ‘‘The Little Nation of South Carolina,’’ if there was any
lesson in the plight of Venice, Italy, which was ‘‘at this very moment,
under the iron heel of Austrian soldiery.’’ The Venetian republic was
established in March 1848, temporarily independent of Hapsburg con-
trol, but without collateral resistance, the Venetians capitulated after
eighteen months. For this reason ‘‘Revolutions ought not to be made
too easily,’’ declared the Southern Rights Association of South Carolina:
‘‘Witness France, where revolutions have become the bloody toy of the
multitude; who fight for they know not what; spurning today the idol of
yesterday, and calling for revolution as they would for a parade, or ‘un
spectacle.’ ’’43
In 1851 Secretary of State Daniel Webster described Louis Napo-
leon’s coup as a ‘‘catastrophe which . . . may weaken the faith of mankind
in . . . popular institutions.’’ Webster correctly assessed proslavery
southerners’ response to such a ‘‘catastrophe.’’ The counterrevolutions
in Europe impressed upon southern radicals that a popular uprising
would lead not to independence but to greater submission to a repressive
regime. Such an uprising, according to the New Orleans-based De Bow’s
Review, would shove southerners down the ill-fated path just taken by
European revolutionaries. De Bow’s asked what the South would gain
should it become independent. Southerners, like the Europeans of 1848,
would be ‘‘a people who revolutionize their government, [only to] de-
pose one tyrant to become subject to another.’’44
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Ultimately southern secessionists at mid-century mimicked the dele-
gates to the Frankfurt Assembly, not only in their independence conven-
tion but also in their failure to act. Pinning their hopes on a burgeoning
spirit of nationalism to join together disparate local causes, they could
not overcome fears of radical action and convince many others to join
them. Amid the Crisis of 1850, the example of revolutionary Europe
augmented domestic events and helped deter the southern impulse
toward secession from the United States: specifically, the fear of anar-
chical upheaval presented by France was more persuasive than the pros-
pect of popular liberation offered by Hungary. With this view,
southerners decided not to undertake a disruptive action that at the time
appeared un-American and foolhardy, a violation not fulfillment of the
conservative tradition of the American Revolution.
Antebellum southerners shared with northerners a fear of radical re-
publicanism. In terms of the impact of foreign revolutions, this national
fear was more compelling than sectional disagreement over those revolu-
tions’ implications for the institution of slavery. Ultimately such a cau-
tious outlook on revolution showed how proslavery partisans in the
South were unexceptional, their outlook on the transatlantic world re-
flecting, not refuting, that of the rest of the nation.
